‘Science and Politics’ by Ian Boyd

Hiding in plain sight with the Oxford brigade

Prof. Sir Ian Boyd has a book out: ‘Science and Politics’ (politybooks.com, around £20). In it, he devotes several pages to describing the events that led up to the start of English badger culls. He talks of attempts to reign in early  plans to get badger culling implemented, when a simple mess-up down to flawed population estimates led to the cull being postponed for a year. He then provides an ‘after the event’ critique of badger culling. Could this be a bit of re-writing of history with the benefit of hindsight, which has shown the inability of its proponents to demonstrate any benefit from the culls? There is no mention of the repeated failures to get a sufficiently good grasp of the veterinary science at the time, or the failure to call-out weak and questionable Government science at the heart of policy.

On February 15^th Boyd was the guest of Sir Charles Godfray in Oxford for a book promotion, where bovine TB and badgers was the most mentioned topic, but the wider issue was politics distorting the scientific process in general. His main thrust appeared to be to point the finger at the politicians (‘charlatans’ he calls them in the book) and also at the Royal Society for not effectively educating the politicians. Boyd has clearly been frustrated by his seven-year experience as Defra chief scientist advisor (CSA), working for what he said might have been a ‘bad batch’ of Defra Ministers. But could he perhaps just be trying to hide his own wrong moves in plain sight?

Boyd’s cull?

If you had to pick one person whose name is synonymous with making the English badger culls happen on the ground during the last decade, it is arguably Ian Boyd, who was CSA for DEFRA from 2012-2019. Although the culls were not his concept, the job description required him to ensure that the policy was implemented, and that’s exactly what he did. He was put in post when the plans for two small pilot culls were underway, and he drove them through under Caroline Spelman and then Owen Paterson at DEFRA. Notably, at a National Farmers Union presentation in 2014, he gave a detailed PowerPoint presentation, where he said that there was no question – badgers had to be killed in order to deal effectively with bovine disease in their cattle. The effect of this was to cement the loathing of badgers for a generation in the livestock community, green-light vets to promote the badger blame game and make continued culling  easier and illegal culling more likely.

By 2015 an Independent Expert Panel on  badger culling was deftly bypassed. Emails released to the High Court would later show how Civil Servants were coached on how to get around legal issues to ensure the full badger cull roll-out from 2016.

The book talk entitled ‘Sir Ian Boyd in conversation with Sir Charles Godfray and Dame Helen Ghosh’ was held at the Oxford Martin building in central Oxford on February 15^th. It put Ian Boyd amongst the scientists from the Randomised Badger Culling Trial (RBCT) study that provided the original (2011) policy justification for badger culling. His book, basically an insiders guide to how politicians and scientific advisors rub along together, was live-screened and put online too, (here). The audience, described by Godfray as ‘prestigious’, included a range of government and ex-government employees who had seen Boyd in office. Sir John Krebs (the main architect of the RBCT) was there alongside Christl Donnelly who did the controversial statistics of the RBCT, and the Emeritus Professor statistician Sir Bernard Silverman who has replaced Donnelly on the recently re-convened bovine TB review panel to be run by – your  guessed it – Charles Godfray. Gideon Henderson who took over the role of CSA at DEFRA after Boyd, was also there. Helen Ghosh who was Director-General of the National Trust during the Badger Culls, made up the third member of the discussion panel, and the meeting took questions from a select few, with one or two further questions from the floor at the end.

The ‘scientifical political predicament’

Boyd’s short  introduction made it plain that his book  was aimed at getting a debate going, and that he was on a ‘good-guy’ mission. When he accepted the Chief Scientific Advisor role at DEFRA, he said that there had been no help to give him insight into what it would be like, and he had to learn very quickly. He felt he was on a learning curve the whole time, and after he had left he felt he had a duty to share his experiences. The first part of his book, his ‘scientifical political predicament’ (the tensions between scientists and politicians) led him to think that by getting involved with politics, scientists actually become ‘corrupted’. It was, he said, a problem that scientists have to try to solve to make the ‘politics factory’ (the people and space where Government happens) more effective. This included the institutions and structures around Government: NGO’s, industry, lobby groups, etc.

Part two of his book takes this further, and is called ‘Science Corrupted’. It was, he said, “really about trying to take the consequences of the processes that science is involved in, with respect to trying to get its voice heard, and understand what effect that has on science. So it’s the scientifical political predicament being played out”. As chair of the UK Research Integrity Office for the last six years, Boyd felt that a lot of the problems that sit with ‘science integrity’ occur at the politics factory interface, and are partly a result of, and partly driven by that process. Within this interface, Boyd described constructs, such as ‘evidence’, ‘what works’, ‘experts’ and ‘normative research’,  and with lots of ‘confirmation bias’ sitting in the research. But he did not distinguish between research that was Government funded and done in-house, and that undertaken by independent bodies. He felt ‘confirmation bias’ occurs mostly in areas of post-normal science where there’s high uncertainty, high demand for results and a lot of controversy. He could have been talking about badger culling, (here). In the mid 1990’s, an impatient if not aggressive MAFF, tore up the veterinary research they did not like and demanded decisive action to cull badgers on behalf of cattle farmers.

‘Marking own homework’

The third part of his book, Boyd said, was called ‘taming the beast’, and about how it might be possible to fix the problem. This would be external to the existing ‘executive, legislative and Judiciary structures’ within Government that look in on how science is used, but were prone to ‘marking their own homework’ to some extent. Hence the continuous degradation of quality within the science being used would be avoided. He felt this would need a lot of hard work and determination, particularly from the scientific community and the leaders within the scientific community.

Helen Ghosh said she had been brought up in the old Department of the Environment, and her Secretaries of State in succession were Michael Heseltine, Tom King, Chris Patton and John Gummer, who had dealt with a lot of very tricky scientific issues. She didn’t recognize, or only recognized partially, Boyd’s characterisation. Boyd then praised Michael Gove (2017-2019) and said he (Boyd) had probably worked through a ‘bad batch’ of SoS’s. There had been good times, but not many, he said (note, before Gove they were Caroline Spelman, Owen Paterson, Liz Truss, and Andrea Leadsom). Ghosh mentioned badgers as being a problem that needed looking at on a ‘systemic basis’ (farming) rather than on a ‘topical basis’ (disease control). The ‘elephant in the room’ however was that if the disease control science been understood and implemented properly, the bovine TB epidemic could have been controlled much sooner. Boyd had failed to get his head around the veterinary science. Badgers and bovine TB were mentioned (although not in any detail) now and again, usually with a nervous smile from those present, many of whom still have considerable ‘skin in the game’.

Emergency ‘car crash’ response

Boyd’s view was that the leadership within the scientific community has to be much more attuned to ‘providing’. Making sure that science gets into the system at a much earlier stage than it tends to do at the moment. With it currently being a sort of emergency ‘car crash’ response a lot of the time. “And it really can’t be. It needs to be involved in designing the car and the road system and all the other things that go on.“  he added. Maybe it was a matter of having science advisors within political parties when coming up with their manifestos, he suggested.

Hindsight

Boyd was asked what he would have wanted to know when he walked into DEFRA’s offices in 2012 and what had he learned subsequently?  Tellingly, he said that he would have preferred to have had a better view on how to deal with the badger culling situation. As mentioned above, Boyd’s book has what some might call selective reporting on this issue. As mentioned, he now frames himself as reticent towards badger culling. He said badger culling was something of a ‘wonderful example’ of the scientifical political predicament “and it’s still ongoing, you know it’s one of these things that just rolls on and on and on. And Gideon’s there, Gideon [Henderson] will be dealing with it right now, you know and John [Krebs] is here, and John dealt with it a lot.” It will go on and on and on. I don’t think there’s one solution to it. But I wish I’d known a lot more about the technical details when I walked in.” So do the badgers. And the cows and farmers.  And the second ‘elephant in the room’ was Boyd (and previously in 2007 David King the Gvt. CSA), failing to check the statistics of badger culling in sufficient depth – King didn’t quite dig deep enough. If either of them had, they would have discovered how weak the association between badgers and bovine TB in cattle truly was. Krebs and Donnelly, sitting in the audience were not going to comment, having created the science that has been used and providing the endorsements politicians needed to set Boyd up to launch mass culls.

Hocus Pocus

Boyd went on to say that he worried about the extent to which there is compromise on the quality of scientific knowledge and argument. He referred to ‘indigenous knowledge’ in the biodiversity and environmental space, and how ‘indigenous peoples’ do know a lot about their environment and actually can bring an immense amount of information to bear on it. This was a bit obscure, but perhaps an oblique attempt at characterising those outside Government/University circles. Some information was ‘Hocus Pocus’ he said, “and we need to be able to identify the difference. We need to identify the good stuff from the bad stuff, or the reliable stuff from the unreliable stuff.” But that was his job wasn’t it?

Boyd bemoaned an ‘awful lot’ of evidence that sits around masquerading as high quality when it is actually quite low quality, but did not give examples. Boyd felt it was “really hard when in a position of having to advise a minister to use this evidence or that evidence, to know what is good and what is bad. “ Hmmm…… 

He continued “In the end you often have to make a judgment about, well, where does it come from, is it reliable source, those sorts of things, or you know, looking at looking at scientific paper and understanding, particularly the methods, are the other methods reliable or not. But even that actually sometimes masquerades as high quality when it’s actually quite low quality” Was that recognition that there has been an excessive reliance of work from sources with the right ‘pedigree’, without sufficient scrutiny?

This seemed to be as close to a confessional over badger culling as you could get. Boyd had little experience with veterinary science or cattle management in 2012 and as a ‘newbie’ had accepted, without enough scrutiny, the ‘Oxford’ science and submitted to the NFU brow-beating approach. Did he only realise, or accept his lack of understanding once he had left his post? Or has he held his confessional back for a reason or two.

So what was he doing by writing his book? Putting it out to all that he was a victim of a broken system?  Hints of contrition?  Was this just an elaborate ‘I got it wrong’ moment – a cathartic admission to purge his conscience and temper his legacy in an era that will be named as a defining one in UK environmental demise? The badger culls (and bovine TB muddle) need not ’roll on and on and on’. But Henderson, the new CSA, picked up the torch from Boyd and still no-one in Oxford wants to be the first to admit, or even mention the overwhelming uncertainty around their badger cull science. And, oh yes, Henderson is an Oxford man too…

Standards being stretched

Boyd’s thesis was that there is need for an official authority to be able to say ’this person is reliable’ and ‘this person isn’t reliable’. As President of the Royal Society of Biology, he said there was an authentication process (Chartered Biologist) that he personally does not use, but his view was that it should be used a lot more. There was scepticism from the audience. Gideon Henderson, who had suffered his own banana skin moment over badger culling data (here) wanted to know how corrupted he personally, and others had become? Presumably he had read Boyd’s previous writings on departmental tribalism (here). He wanted more detail, and to understand the nature of the corruption? Awkward.

Fiona Fox from the Science Media Centre made a remark that seemed more like a jibe, and with a distinct sarcastic edge than a question, possibly not understanding the way SMC gets used by civil servants; “…should academic scientists be expected to understand the policy process and understand what hell you are all clearly going through?” Unabashed, Boyd said that he felt ‘his standards’ were being stretched to some extent, and it had taken quite a lot of will, and self-discipline, to make sure that the basic scientific standards that he had been taught and had practiced for a very long time, were sustained and maintained. On corruption he said that people who get involved who are ‘not so wise’, could fall into a trap, which is basically to produce what he called ‘normative science’. Otherwise sometimes referred to as ‘policy-based science’. This is science that is helping to drive policy in a particular direction, and that he confirmed was what he meant by corruption. You could look at plenty of DEFRA agency constructs that fit this bill, but complying with civil service protocol,  Boyd was not naming names of anyone still in post. Did Henderson really not realise he just might fall into the category of ‘unwise person’? The polite tensions in the room were palpable and it was not clear who was having dinner with whom afterwards. The wrinkled noses in the audience were those of the civil servants who know about the problems and observe a protocol not to boat-rock once they have left office . At least Boyd deserves credit for speaking out, albeit a bit too late.

Boyd continued “I don’t really mean individuals are making an overt decision to undermine science. I think that there is an invidious underlying process that draws them in, in order to be able to produce the results that somebody else wants rather than the results that actually really are needed. So that’s what I mean by it. So it’s not a personalized criticism.” He unconvincingly wriggled around the tribal fear culture. His ‘tribalism’ thesis was the way in which, as a whistle blower, he was balancing being seen to seek honest reform (within the den of thieves in Parliament) with risking the extensive ‘pissing off’ of those outside Westminster, who might still lean over and damage any future ambitions.

Prof Bernard Silverman (statistician and renounced curate now standing in for recused Christl Donnelly in the Godfray bovine TB review panel) was the Home Office’s Chief Scientific Advisor, overlapping with Boyd’s tenure (here). He asked about the role of the Royal Society, of which he is a Fellow. Boyd went into overdrive: “ The problem is the Royal Society actually. And I’m saying that in a public domain. Where you have the premier organization which has a capacity to really knock on the highest political door in the country. And it does need to do more of a coordinating activity. I have no doubt about that at all. But it doesn’t, and I’ll leave it at that. And I see you nodding.” Boyd thought that science would do well to look at some of the other professions and how they manage quality control within those professions; the scientific community could come up with a new system. But it needed to be valued by the policy profession.

Also present were Claire Moriarty, past permanent secretary in DEFRA during Boyd’s period of office, Claire Craig who was Director of the Government Office for Science, Jim Naismith, Head of The Mathematical, Physical and Life Sciences (MPLS) division at Oxford University and John Beddington (London Zoo).

So what can be taken home from all of this?  Basically, there is continuing pressure to produce results to fit a political agenda, mistakes are commonplace, they continue to be made, and the way to prevent the same thing from happening in the future is far from clear. Learned societies need to step-up, but acceptance of the problem is not universal. One thing is certain however; badgers, cows and the livestock industry lost out from the tangle of ‘Science and Politics’ before, during and after Boyd’s time in office, with 2014 targets now missed. Until those responsible take a good look at themselves and the mountain of hindsight now available, disgraceful waste will continue.